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The economic literature suggests that government’s borrowing costs depend on the 
fundamental economic conditions, particularly the fiscal stance and key macroeconomic 
developments (see, e.g., Poghosyan, 2012).1 There seems to be widespread understanding that an 
under-pricing of sovereign risk in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) occurred before the 
2008-2009 economic and financial crisis, while an overpricing of it followed during the subsequent 
sovereign debt crisis. Such developments were caused both by the fluctuations in the risk appetite 
and by Euro area country-specific concerns regarding underlying economic fundamentals. The 
successful elimination of fears of a looming Eurozone break-up following the Global Financial 
Crisis, can be partly attributed to improvements in economic fundamentals (particularly in 
periphery European countries) (Muellbauer, 2014). This suggests that economic announcements 
(which often include release of new economic projections and/or announcements of (fiscal or 
monetary) policy decisions by EU institutions) are an important source of information, containing 
news that typically spills over internationally across markets, affecting sovereign bond yields 
(Andersen et al., 2006). To the extent that fundamentals are well captured by forecasts produced 
by official (and/or private sector) agencies, the release of such forward-looking views on an 
economy’s performance can affect yields by offering market participants valuable insights and by 
shaping their expectations on potential portfolio returns. 2 
Rational investors absorb and incorporate all the available information at their disposal in 
real-time, meaning that there are no information rigidities, thus a release of new information will 
cause a rearrangement in their investment portfolio. A forecast revision in a positive and desirable 
way (e.g. higher GDP growth, lower public debt, lower unemployment, etc.) should bring the 
sovereign yields down, as more investors are interested in buying bonds of this country due to the 
lower risk of default. The same would be true of a positive assessment of the EC relative to a 
Stability and Growth Program of a given country. In addition, monetary policy events, typically 
the ECB’s conventional and unconventional monetary policies, would also play a role in the 
                                                 
1 For example, as governments debt rises, sovereign bond yields should go up in recognition of the higher risk (default, 
monetization-driven depreciation and inflation) carried by investors holding government securities. 
2 Expectations have long been ascribed a central role in macroeconomics (Pigou, 1927). For instance, Balduzzi, Elton 
and Green (2001) considered the effects of US announcements on US yields outcomes. An earlier study by Porter-





development of sovereign yield spreads, directly or indirectly either via changes in the aggregate 
demand or via changes in the fiscal behavior. 
In this paper, we study the impact of macroeconomic, fiscal and monetary developments 
and well-defined events on sovereign bond yield spreads in 10 Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) countries. Such developments cover the European Commission (EC) releases (twice a year 
until Autumn 2012 and three times a year afterwards) of short-term economic forecasts for the 
member states of the EMU.  This is a natural and legitimate avenue of research that has been 
somewhat neglected in the literature in the sense that most papers have not look closely at the role 
played by different types of forecasts (see section 2 for details). We consider one source for 
macroeconomic and fiscal expectations: the EC’s forecasts.3 Additionally, we have collected 
information on the EC’s announcements regarding the excessive deficit procedures (EDP) that 
contains information regarding the adoption of appropriate policy responses to correct excessive 
deficits and/or debts by the member states. Moreover, we study the impact of the monetary policy 
events such as the announcements of the ECB’s interest rates together with the announcements of 
unconventional monetary policy on the sovereign bond yield spreads of the sample countries. 
We contribute to the literature notably by:  i) constructing a set of fiscal events, type 1 and 
type 2, related to the EC announcements of fiscal developments and excessive debt procedures 
related decisions in 10-Euro area countries; ii) conducting an identification and analysis of 
conventional and non-conventional monetary policy events; iii) assessing the impact of fiscal and 
monetary policy events on 10-year sovereign bond yield spreads. 
Our main results show that the ECB’s key interest rates announcements mainly the deposit 
facility, main refinancing operations and marginal lending facility rate tenders, negatively affected 
the bond yield spreads of the sample countries. Moreover, the announcements of the nonstandard 
measures of the ECB notably the first covered bond purchase programme and the longer-term 
refinancing operations contributed to decreasing the spreads. Regarding the impact of the fiscal 
policy events, we found that the EC releases of the economic forecasts on government debt and 
budget balance contribute to increase and decrease the spreads respectively. The EC releases of the 
excessive deficit procedures (EDP) contribute in reducing the yield spreads.  
                                                 
3 Nowadays, the European Commission (EC) releases on a regular basis short-term economic forecasts for more than 
180 variables of member states of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Most studies suggest that forecasts 
produced by international organizations are less subjected to biases. Keereman (1999) was the first to examine the 





The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. 
The following section presents the empirical methodology and describes the data used. Section 4 
discusses the main empirical results and the last section concludes. 
 
2. Literature 
There is a vast literature looking at the determinants of sovereign yields. Studies looking 
specifically at EMU’s bond yields include the work by Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009).  
Some studies, in the spirit of this paper, have proxied fundamentals using expectations about 
the future values of key macroeconomic variables and related these to interest rates or yields or 
financial variables. Canzoneri et al. (2003) using Congressional Budget Office (CBO) budget 
forecasts, found that there existed a sizable and statistically significant effect of projected surpluses 
on the spread between long-term treasury yields and Treasury bill yields. Strauch et al. (2004) 
conclude that when actual output growth exceeds its forecast, the budget balance improves when 
compared with budget predictions; Moulin and Wierts (2006) identified effects from divergence in 
predictions in GDP as well as from expenditure or revenue items; Afonso (2010) shows that yields 
increase with better growth forecasts and with decreases in budget balance ratios. Beirne and 
Fratzscher (2013), based on panel regressions, found that the increase of interest rate spreads in the 
Eurozone could be explained by a combination of deteriorating fundamentals and an increased 
sensitivity of investments for these fundamentals. Afonso and Nunes (2015) assessed whether 
forecast revisions of macro variables affected sovereign yields in a sample of 15 European 
countries between 1999 and 2012. They found that corrections in both macro and fiscal variables 
had a strong influence in sovereign bond yields (and more strongly so in countries characterized 
by weak fundamentals). Godl and Kleinert (2016) explored whether and to what extent government 
bond yields were driven by fundamentals as opposed to market sentiments. Similarly, to our 
approach, they also relied on EC’s forecasts, which they argued to be important sources of 
information to investors for assessing the future solvency of governments. These authors provided 
empirical evidence that government bond yields indeed react to negative economic forecasts. More 
recently, De Grauwe, Ji and Macchiarelli (2017) also found that government bond markets in the 
Eurozone to be highly sensitive to changing fundamentals. 
Regarding specific event studies there are different methodologies in the literature. Afonso 
and Strauch (2007) evaluate to which extent relevant fiscal policy events taking place in 2002 





some evidence in that direction. Arru et al. (2012) conducted a study including six countries from 
the EMU where they gauge about the impact of macroeconomic data releases from several macro-
areas such as US, Japan and EU. These authors applied a method used by Balduzzi et al. (2001) 
and Andersen et al. (2005) to compute the so-called standardized news. They find a reaction by the 
sample countries, excluding Spain, from positive news in the US, and that macroeconomic 
surprises on the Euro-area business cycle affect the volatility of the series for four of the six sample 
countries and these reactions are only captured by negative surprises.  
Focusing on the second type of the fiscal policy events that we use in this paper, we can 
mention a very recent study by Kalan et al. (2018) who estimate the effects of the fiscal rules 
specifically the Excessive debt procedure (EDP) on sovereign yield spreads for the 28 EU countries 
over the period 1999 to 2016. Using dynamic panel estimation techniques, they find that the 
sovereign spreads of countries under an EDP are higher than countries that are not under an EDP.  
On the other hand, the monetary policy events literature gives some important insights 
about how markets react to central bank’s monetary policy. For the Euro area, Andersson et al. 
(2009) and Bernoth and Hagen (2004) found evidence in the German long-term bond market and 
in EURIBOR futures market that agents predict well the ECB´s monetary policy, reflecting 
transparency in ECB´s monetary policy conduction. Interestingly, Brand et al. (2010), for the 
money market yield, found that expectations from monetary policy change considerably during 
ECB´s press conferences. Finally, Andersson et al. (2009) compares the ECB’s and the FED’s 
monetary policy and concludes that both US bond and stock markets react more to the FED´s 
monetary policy decisions than respectively the Euro area bond and stock market react to the ECB´s 
monetary policy decisions. 
In addition to economic fundamentals and specific monetary or fiscal policy events as 
determinants of sovereign bond yields or spreads, other factors have been found in the literature to 
be relevant predictors and that we employ in our empirical analysis. In particular, it is important to 
account for international risk, typically approximated using indexes of US stock market implied 
volatility or the spread between the yields of US corporate bonds against US treasury bills (Afonso 
et al., 2015; Silvapulle et al., 2016).  Another aspect is the liquidity risk, usually proxied using bid-







3. Methodology and Data 
3.1. Methodology 
Our empirical analysis considers first the main determinants of sovereign spreads on a panel 
of 10 EU countries, namely: industrial production (percentage change with respect to Germany) 
and real effective exchange rate (both retrieved from the EC forecasts), international risk (proxied 
by the VIX) and the bid-ask spread. As a second step, we specifically assess the additional 
relevance of specific fiscal and monetary events for sovereign spreads from January 1999 until July 
2016.  
The event variables are constructed by flag procedure assuming so that there are two types 
of events, positive and negative, corresponding to a lower (higher) sovereign spread. Using 
monthly data, when there is a positive or a negative event on a given month we attribute the values 
-1 or 1 respectively and 0 for the non-event months. The monetary events are selected by collecting 
the interest rate policy announcements done by the ECB during the sample period. The fiscal policy 
events are collected from the EC website, based on the EU fiscal surveillance mechanism. With 
the purpose of capturing the fiscal policy decision-making in the EU, the assembled events are 
divided in two groups. One is composed by press releases resulting from the Commission 
assessment of the stability and convergence programs. The second group is essentially composed 
by press releases related with the EDP´s that were implemented during the sample period.  
We estimate directly the set of different determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads on 
the entire panel of 10 Euro area countries. Mathematically, our main regression equation is the 
following: 
 
𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜌𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (1) 
 
where 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡 denotes the sovereign bond yield spread relative to Germany’s, 𝑋𝑖𝑡  is a vector of 
determinants already identified above. The coefficient 𝛽 measures the degree of sensitivity of 
sovereign spreads to a given determinant. 𝛼𝑖, 𝜌𝑡 denote country and time effects, respectively. The 
former capture unobserved heterogeneity across countries, and time-unvarying factors such as 
geographical variables; the latter aim to control for global shocks. Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a disturbance term 





Equation (1) is first estimated by Ordinary Least Squares with robust standard errors 
clustered at the country level. We consider specifications with and without country and/or time 
effects for robustness purposes. Time fixed effects are included to control for global shocks; 
country fixed effects are included to control for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity and time 
invariant characteristics (geography, institutional aspects, etc.). In the robustness section, we take 
into account potential endogeneity concerns by re-estimating (1) with a Two Stage Least Squares 
approach. 
 
3.2. Data  
Our empirical analysis relies on a panel of ten Euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) using monthly data 
between January 1999 and July 2016. Following existing literature, we will model spreads on a 
fixed block of determinants that deal with international risk conditions, liquidity risk and credit 
risk. First, international financial risk will be proxied by the S&P 500 implied stock market 
volatility index (VIX), a common proxy for global financial instability (Mody, 2009; Beber et al., 
2009; Gerlach et al., 2010; Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012). We expect a higher (lower) value for the 
global risk factor to cause an increase (reduction) in government bond spreads. Second, the 10-
year government bond bid-ask spread will serve as our measure of bond market illiquidity, with a 
higher value of this spread indicating a fall in liquidity leading to an increase in government bond 
yield spreads (Codogno et al., 2003; Gomez-Puig, 2006). Credit risk will be captured using a 
number of macro/fiscal indicators. Third, a real exchange rate appreciation is expected to increase 
spreads as justified by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2011) and Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012).  
In addition, to capture the effects of economic growth, we use the annual growth rate of 
industrial production (relative to that of Germany), capturing the argument of Alesina et al. (1992) 
according to which sovereign debt becomes riskier during periods of economic slack.  
Moreover, we add to the model four types of events as explanatory variables. We add the 
ECB’s interest rates announcements on the Deposit facility (DF), Marginal Lending Facility (MLF) 
and Main Refinancing Operations (MROs) and call them as Monetary Policy (MP) type 1 events. 
We also consider the Unconventional Monetary policy events of the ECB as MP type 2 events 
specifically the announcements of the longer term refinancing operations (LTROs), securities 





the fiscal forecasts of the EC of the government debt, budget balance and current account balance 
as Fiscal Policy (FP) type 1 events and the EC’s EDP decisions as FP type 2 events. Table 1 




Table A1 in the Appendix presents the summary statistics of the relevant variables while 
Table A2 shows detailed data definitions and sources. Finally, Tables A3-A5 provide the fiscal and 
monetary events dataset that we have constructed for our empirical analysis. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Baseline 
In the first step, we estimate the baseline model considering the main determinants of 
sovereign yield spreads identified earlier. We find that, Industrial production and bid-ask spread 
have a negative and positive statistically significant impact on yield spreads respectively (as 
expected) when using the Pooled OLS and fixed effect OLS. We do not find evidence of 
statistically significant impacts of neither VIX nor REER on spreads. However, we found a positive 
and statistically significant impact of VIX on the spreads in our robustness analysis. 
 
4.1.1 MP type 1 events 
Considering the first type of the monetary policy events, we find that all of the ECB’s key 
interest rates announcements contribute to reduce the spreads when running Pooled OLS and fixed 
effects OLS. For instance, when considering the results of the pooled OLS regression, we see that 
the announcement of rates on the DF contributed to reduce the spreads by 0.607 percentage points 
on average. The announcement of interest rates on the MLF contributed to reduce the spreads by 
0.533 percentage points and the announcement of the rates on the MROs contributed to decrease 
the spreads by 0.682 percentage points on average when running pooled OLS regressions. 
However, when considering the rates on the DF and MLF in a single regression, the impact of the 
MLF disappears in both types of regressions (see Tables 2 and 3). The country-specific rates on 
the MROs also contribute to decreasing the spreads. These results are in line with the literature 





literature that found that the ECB’s key interest rates contribute to reducing the spreads (see, e.g., 





4.1.2 MP type 2 events 
Using the second type of the monetary policy variables in pooled OLS regressions, we find 
that the impact of the announcement of the SMPs on spreads is positive (against our priors): such 
announcements increase spreads by 0.018 percentage points on average. However, in this 
specification (specification (9)), the real effective exchange rate contributes to lower spreads (we 
find a negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate) which is (yet again) contrary to our 
expectations. The signs of the other monetary policy event variables appear to be negative but not 
statistically different from zero. 
Adding fixed effects yields some additional insights. We find that the announcements of 
the CBPP1 contribute to decreasing the spreads (negative significant signs) by 0.257 percentage 
points on average. SMP’s events effect is no longer statistically significant and real effective 
exchange rate, now, contributes to increase spreads, which is actually as what we expected. 
We do not find any statistically significant impact of longer-term refinancing operations 
announcements on 10-year sovereign bond yield spreads. 
 
4.1.3 FP type 1 events 
Including the first type of fiscal policy events in the regressions, we find that EC releases 
on the Excessive Deficit Procedures (EDP) have a positive and statistically significant impact on 
spreads when running both Pooled and fixed effects regressions (see Tables 4 and 5). This means 
that noncomplying with the EU fiscal framework (that is, being under an EDP) contributes to an 
average increase in spreads of 0.889 or 0.595 percentage points, for pooled or fixed effects 
regressions respectively. This is in line with the results obtained by Kalan et al. (2018).  
 
4.1.4 FP type 2 events 
Adding the second type of fiscal policy event variables to the baseline model, we observe 





to the increase in spreads (approximately 0.04 and 0.06 percentage points on average for pooled or 
fixed effects regressions respectively). However, when using both 1 year and 2 years-ahead 
forecasts announcements in one regression, the one year ahead debt forecast announcements lead 
to a fall in spreads (not statistically significant in fixed effects regressions) while the two year-
ahead forecast announcements lead to a rise in spreads. 
The announcements of the 1 year and 2 years ahead forecasts of the budget balance tend to 
lower spreads in both pooled and fixed effect regressions (we obtain negative and statistically 
significant coefficient estimates). We find that the impact of the announcement of the one-year 
ahead forecast of the budget balance on spreads is slightly higher than the announcements of the 
two years-ahead forecasts. When both forecasts are considered in one single regression the impact 
of the two years ahead forecast disappears irrespective of the type of regression. 
Announcements of the current account balance forecasts, when estimating fixed effects 
regressions, contribute to an increase in spreads, while in the pooled OLS regression these 
announcements have no significant impact. Including both forecasts events in one regression, the 
announcement of one year-ahead forecast seems to have a negative impact on spreads (only in 
pooled OLS regression) and the two years-ahead forecast announcements have positive impact on 






 Due to potential endogeneity concerns of some of our variables in the 𝑋𝑖𝑡  vector, we rely 
on a Two-Stage-Least-Squares estimator to re-run equation (1). We employ lags of the dependent 
variable and regressors are the instruments. We use the Hansen J statistic - test of over identification 
- to test the validity of the over identifying restrictions. With the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic - 
under identification test - we test whether our instruments are relevant.When running fixed effects 
IV (Table 6), the impact of VIX becomes statistically significant (positive as expected). All the 
remaining baseline variables remain qualitatively unchanged.  
We then look at the diagnostic presented to assess the validity of the instrumental variable 





correlated with the endogenous regressors). Our obtained statistics generally reject the null that the 
different equations are underidentified. Then the Hansen test statistics reveal that the instrument 
sets contain valid instruments (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded 
instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation) is not rejected. 
 
4.2.1 MP type 1 
Running fixed effects IV (Table 6, specifications 2-6) gives us slightly different results. 
Whereas the announcement of the rates on the DF does not have significant impact on spreads 
anymore but MLF rates announcements lead to an increase in spreads. However, when we include 
both interest rates on the DF and MLF in a single regression we find that the announcement of DF 
rates contributes to lower spreads while the announcement of the MLF leads to a rise in spreads. 
We do not find any statistically significant impact of MROs rates announcements on spreads but 
the country specific interest rates on MROs lead to a fall in spreads. In general, coefficient estimates 
turn out with a higher level of significance when running the fixed effects IV and the only variable 
that appears not to be significant is REER. 
 
4.2.2 MP type 2 
As we can observe in Table 6, the announcements of LTROs (LTRO includes also the 
TLTROs while Net_LTRO only includes the LTROs) together with the announcements of 
TLTRO-I and TLTRO-II and CBPP1 contribute in decreasing the spreads slightly SMP’s impact 
is not significant anymore. More variables of each specification appear to have significant impact 




4.2.3 FP type 1 
When implementing fixed effects IV, the effect of an EDP event appears to increase bond 
spreads, as before and all the variables in the model appear to have statistically significant impact 
on the yield spreads (see Table 5). 
 





Once more, both 1 year and 2 years-ahead forecasts announcements of public debt 
contribute to increase spreads when using them separately in the fixed effects IV regression but 
when both forecasts are included together in one regression, the 2 years-ahead forecasts 
announcement appears to decrease spreads. The one-year and two years-ahead forecast 
announcements of the budget balance contribute to reduce spreads (negative and statistically 
significant coefficient) but when both are considered together in one regression the impact of the 
announcement of the 2 years-ahead forecast disappears. The announcements of the forecasts of the 
current account balance appear not to have any significant impact on the spreads. However, when 
using both forecasts in one regression, the announcement of the one year-ahead forecast seems to 
have a negative impact and the announcement of the two years-ahead forecasts has a positive 
impact on spreads. 
[Table 7] 
 
5. Conclusion  
 In this paper, we studied the impact of macroeconomic, fiscal and monetary developments 
and well-defined events on sovereign bond yield spreads in 10 Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) countries for the period 01:1999 – 07.2016 implementing pooled and fixed effects OLS 
and IV regressions.  
We modelled spreads on a fixed block of determinants that deal with international risk 
conditions, liquidity risk, credit risk and economic growth. In addition, we added to the model four 
different types of fiscal and monetary event variables. Fiscal events data include the European 
Commission (EC) releases of the short-term economic forecasts as well as the Excessive Deficit 
Procedures (EDP). Monetary events data include the announcements of the ECB’s main interest 
rates and the unconventional monetary policies.  
Our results showed that the announcement of a negative fiscal forecast by EC (e.g. upward 
revision in the public-to-GDP ratio) contributed to the increase in bond spreads while a positive 
fiscal announcement (e.g. downward revision in the public-to-GDP ratio) contributed to the 
decrease in spreads. We also found that noncomplying with the EDP, tends to increase sovereign 
yield spreads. These results imply that the investors associate higher risk of default to the bonds of 





Regarding the monetary events, we found that the announcements of the ECB’s interest 
rates contributed to decreasing the spreads. Moreover, we found that the announcements of the 
longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs), and the first covered bond purchase programme 
(CBPP1) negatively affected the sovereign yield spreads of the sample countries. 
Further work could consider the effects of the gradual phasing out of the non-conventional 
monetary policy measures of the ECB, once they have played out in the markets. Another possible 
avenue of research could focus on the EC announcements related not only to the EDP events, but 
also the more recent ones linked to the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure. However, to conduct 
such analyses empirically more time needs to elapse to allow sufficient degrees of freedom. 
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Table 1 – Events’ nomenclature 
 MP events FP events 
Type 1 Interest rate 
announcements 
EC fiscal forecasts 
Type 2 Unconventional 
Monetary policy 
(TLTRO and purchase 
programs) 





Table 2. Baseline and Monetary Policy Events (type 1 and 2) – Pooled OLS 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Regressors  baseline MP type 1 MP type 2 
           
IP_PCH_DEU -0.0886* -0.0922* -0.0906* -0.0921* -0.0917* -0.1195* -0.0887* -0.0900* -0.2683** -0.2323** 
 (0.047) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.058) (0.047) (0.047) (0.103) (0.092) 
vix 0.0029 -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0023 -0.0025 0.0223*** 0.0042 0.0048 0.0078 0.0341* 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.026) (0.016) 
reer -0.0288 -0.0288 -0.0288 -0.0288 -0.0288 -0.0591 -0.0284 -0.0281 -0.2344** -0.2087** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.043) (0.025) (0.024) (0.083) (0.090) 
bid_ask 6.9975*** 6.9868*** 6.9909*** 6.9869*** 6.9873*** 6.6256*** 7.0502*** 7.0584*** 5.7849*** 5.8879*** 
 (0.886) (0.888) (0.888) (0.888) (0.888) (0.912) (0.857) (0.854) (0.931) (0.965) 
D.DF  -0.6073**  -0.4197***       
  (0.244)  (0.128)       
D.MLF   -0.5333* -0.2596       
   (0.254) (0.187)       
D.MRO     -0.6822**      
     (0.293)      
D.CMRO      -0.0000     
      (0.000)     
D.LTRO       -0.0020    
       (0.002)    
D.Net_LTRO        -0.0023   
        (0.002)   
D.SMP_p         0.0182*  
         (0.010)  
D.CBPP1_p          -0.0296 
          (0.074) 
           
Observations 1,940 1,940 1,940 1,940 1,940 1,304 1,940 1,940 704 804 
R-squared 0.5132 0.5143 0.5142 0.5144 0.5145 0.5429 0.5151 0.5157 0.6127 0.6088 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the 10-year bond yield spread (relative to Germany). Robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level are in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. Prefix “D” denotes first difference of a given variable. A constant term was 


















Table 3. Baseline and Monetary Policy Events (type 1 and 2) –  
fixed effects OLS 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Regressors  baseline MP type 1 MP type 2 
           
IP_PCH_DEU -0.0970** -0.1018** -0.0996** -0.1016** -0.1011** -0.1314** -0.0965** -0.0973** -0.0401 -0.0984** 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.043) (0.034) (0.035) (0.089) (0.038) 
vix 0.0031 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0024 -0.0026 0.0234*** 0.0041 0.0046 0.0200 0.0435*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.017) (0.012) 
reer -0.0324 -0.0327 -0.0326 -0.0327 -0.0327 -0.0706 -0.0318 -0.0315 0.0820** 0.0099 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.041) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.013) 
bid_ask 6.1898*** 6.1767*** 6.1818*** 6.1768*** 6.1775*** 5.7623*** 6.2332*** 6.2418*** 3.7152*** 4.1265*** 
 (0.792) (0.793) (0.793) (0.793) (0.793) (0.768) (0.768) (0.765) (0.554) (0.579) 
D.DF  -0.6644**  -0.4758***       
  (0.212)  (0.116)       
D.MLF   -0.5707** -0.2609       
   (0.237) (0.203)       
D.MRO     -0.7382**      
     (0.264)      
D.CMRO      -0.0000*     
      (0.000)     
D.LTRO       -0.0015    
       (0.001)    
D.Net_LTRO        -0.0018   
        (0.002)   
D.SMP_p         0.0078  
         (0.011)  
D.CBPP1_p          -0.2572** 
          (0.104) 
           
Observations 1,940 1,940 1,940 1,940 1,940 1,304 1,940 1,940 704 804 
R-squared 0.5989 0.6003 0.6000 0.6004 0.6004 0.6342 0.6000 0.6004 0.8287 0.8023 
Note: Dependent variable is the 10-year bond yield spread (relative to Germany). Robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level are in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. Prefix “D” denotes first difference of a given variable.  Country and time 
effects were estimated but omitted for reasons of parsimony. A constant term was also estimated but omitted. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.  
 
Table 4. Baseline and Fiscal Policy Events (type 1 and 2) – Pooled OLS 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Regressors FP type 2 FP type 1 
           
IP_PCH_DEU -0.0889* -0.0799** -0.0444* -0.0621 -0.0713** -0.0567* -0.0701 -0.0521** -0.0319 -0.0110 
 (0.045) (0.033) (0.022) (0.036) (0.031) (0.026) (0.039) (0.022) (0.025) (0.027) 
vix 0.0025 0.0236*** 0.0007 -0.0026 0.0218*** -0.0008 -0.0012 0.0150*** 0.0038 -0.0063 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) 
reer -0.0288 0.0254** -0.0230 -0.0294 0.0246* -0.0258 -0.0293 0.0164 -0.0193 -0.0302 
 (0.025) (0.011) (0.025) (0.024) (0.012) (0.026) (0.025) (0.014) (0.025) (0.023) 
bid_ask 6.9435*** 5.5434*** 6.6297*** 6.8450*** 5.4678*** 6.6967*** 6.9069*** 5.4579*** 6.5880*** 5.9953*** 
 (0.906) (1.140) (0.868) (0.940) (1.137) (0.915) (0.926) (1.119) (0.795) (0.984) 
EDP 0.8895*          
 (0.407)          
f1_debt  0.0377**      -0.0934**   
  (0.013)      (0.037)   
f1_OB   -0.2147***      -0.5536*  
   (0.063)      (0.258)  
f1_CAB    -0.0680      -1.8309* 
    (0.042)      (0.838) 
f2_debt     0.0388**   0.1303**   
     (0.013)   (0.045)   
f2_OB      -0.1901**   0.3405  
      (0.060)   (0.254)  
f2_CAB       -0.0514   1.7607* 
       (0.038)   (0.822) 
           
Observations 1,940 1,940 1,940 1,940 1,940 1,940 1,940 1,940 1,940 1,940 
R-squared 0.5164 0.6608 0.5682 0.5273 0.6734 0.5579 0.5213 0.6860 0.5748 0.6132 
Note: Dependent variable is the 10-year bond yield spread (relative to Germany). Robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level are in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. Prefix “f1” and “f2” denote one or two years-ahead forecasts of a given 
variable, respectively. A constant term was also estimated but omitted. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 








Table 5. Baseline and Fiscal Policy Events (type 1 and 2) –fixed effects OLS 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Regressors FP type 2 FP type 1 
           
IP_PCH_DEU -0.0976** -0.0896*** -0.0491** -0.1113** -0.0794*** -0.0663** -0.1112** -0.0751*** -0.0274 -0.0590** 
 (0.034) (0.024) (0.019) (0.036) (0.022) (0.021) (0.036) (0.019) (0.027) (0.020) 
vix 0.0029 0.0359*** 0.0009 0.0099 0.0312*** -0.0002 0.0116* 0.0286*** 0.0040 0.0041 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
reer -0.0325 0.0348*** -0.0253 -0.0199 0.0285** -0.0301 -0.0162 0.0246* -0.0172 -0.0233 
 (0.030) (0.011) (0.028) (0.030) (0.011) (0.029) (0.028) (0.012) (0.028) (0.030) 
bid_ask 6.1617*** 4.6529*** 5.9212*** 6.1769*** 4.6468*** 5.9777*** 6.1260*** 4.6702*** 5.8841*** 5.6646*** 
 (0.797) (0.944) (0.799) (0.755) (0.947) (0.841) (0.728) (0.933) (0.724) (0.800) 
EDP 0.5954**          
 (0.234)          
f1_debt  0.0594***      -0.0268   
  (0.017)      (0.024)   
f1_OB   -0.2059***      -0.5762*  
   (0.060)      (0.283)  
f1_CAB    0.0994*      -1.3492 
    (0.048)      (0.775) 
f2_debt     0.0570***   0.0818*   
     (0.017)   (0.038)   
f2_OB      -0.1750**   0.3680  
      (0.060)   (0.280)  
f2_CAB       0.1281**   1.4066* 
       (0.048)   (0.752) 
           
Observations 1,940 1,940 1,940 1,940 1,940 1,940 1,940 1,940 1,940 1,940 
R-squared 0.6003 0.7467 0.6392 0.6083 0.7543 0.6300 0.6158 0.7551 0.6463 0.6572 
Note: Dependent variable is the 10-year bond yield spread (relative to Germany). Robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level are in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. Prefix “f1” and “f2” denote one or two years-ahead forecasts of a given 
variable, respectively. Country and time effects were estimated but omitted for reasons of parsimony. A constant term was also 































Table 6. Robustness: Monetary Policy Events (type 1 and 2) –fixed effects IV 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Regressors  baseline MP type 1 MP type 2 



















 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.008) 
vix 0.0052*** 0.0050*** 0.0062*** 0.0058*** 0.0057*** 0.0085***  0.0057*** 0.0058*** 0.0160** 0.0153*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.004) 
reer -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0046**  -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0273*** 0.0097* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.006) 
bid_ask 0.7490*** 0.7491*** 0.7469*** 0.7453*** 0.7483*** 0.7775***  0.7751*** 0.7780*** 0.9084*** 0.8983*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.062)  (0.051) (0.051) (0.084) (0.080) 
D.DF  -0.0239  -0.1928**        
  (0.068)  (0.091)        
D.MLF   0.1158* 0.2392***        
   (0.064) (0.087)        
D.MRO     0.0595       
     (0.072)       
D.CMRO      -
0.0000*** 
     
      (0.000)      
D.LTRO        -
0.0008*** 
   
        (0.000)    
D.Net_LTRO         -
0.0008*** 
  
         (0.000)   
D.SMP_p          -0.0015  
          (0.004)  
D.CBPP1_p           -
0.0402*** 
           (0.014) 
            








0.200 0.489 0.227 0.181 0.488 0.685  0.726 0.893 0.996 0.787 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the 10-year bond yield spread (relative to Germany). Robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level are in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. Prefix “D” denotes first difference of a given variable. Country and time 
effects were estimated but omitted for reasons of parsimony. A constant term was also estimated but omitted. The null hypothesis 
of the Kleibergen-Paap test is that the structural equation is underidentified (i.e., the rank condition fails). Stock-Yogo critical values 
were applied. The Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions.  *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 























Table 7. Robustness: Fiscal Policy Events (type 1 and 2) –fixed effects IV 
 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Regressors FP type 2 FP type 1 





















 (0.016) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
vix 0.0327*** 0.0075*** 0.0049*** 0.0054*** 0.0073*** 0.0048*** 0.0056*** 0.0066*** 0.0050*** 0.0049*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
reer -0.0081* 0.0032** -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0030** -0.0008 -0.0001 0.0019 -0.0003 -0.0009 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
bid_ask 4.7698*** 0.7911*** 0.7716*** 0.7532*** 0.8010*** 0.7659*** 0.7571*** 0.8085*** 0.7737*** 0.7662*** 
 (0.141) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) 
EDP 0.3523*          
 (0.199)          
f1_debt  0.0044***      -0.0071**   
  (0.001)      (0.003)   
f1_OB   -
0.0177*** 
     -0.0294*  
   (0.004)      (0.017)  
f1_CAB    0.0033      -
0.1177*** 
    (0.004)      (0.025) 
f2_debt     0.0045***   0.0111***   
     (0.001)   (0.003)   
f2_OB      -
0.0158*** 
  0.0115  
      (0.004)   (0.016)  
f2_CAB       0.0058   0.1185*** 
       (0.004)   (0.025) 
           








0.113 0.399 0.989 0.988 0.292 0.834 0.323 0.872 0.696 0.301 
           
 
Note: Dependent variable is the 10-year bond yield spread (relative to Germany). Robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level are in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. Prefix “f1” and “f2” denote one or two years-ahead forecasts of a given 
variable, respectively. Country and time effects were estimated but omitted for reasons of parsimony. A constant term was also 
estimated but omitted. The null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap test is that the structural equation is underidentified (i.e., the rank 
condition fails). Stock-Yogo critical values were applied. The Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions.   *, **, *** denote 










Table A1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Bond_Spread 2,110 1.117 2.528 -0.050 27.390 
VIX 2,100 20.811 7.940 10.420 59.890 
BAS 2,048 0.042 0.245 -0.004 5.886 
REER 2,090 98.900 11.102 70.125 144.533 
IP_PCH_DEU 1,990 -0.403 2.763 -10.776 20.385 
DF 2,110 1.2431 1.2197 -0.400 3.750 
MLF 2,110 2.873 1.633 0.250 5.750 
MRO_F 1,120 1.115 1.049 0.000 4.250 
MRO_V 1,000 3.125 0.953 2.000 4.750 
LTRO 2,110 309.945 284.072 45.000 1092.400 
Net_LTRO 2,110 274.114 287.771 20.800 1092.400 
TLTRO_l 230 311.348 126.833 63.900 425.100 
TLTRO_ll 10 399.300 0.000 399.300 399.300 
SMP 750 147.576 51.632 35.000 219.500 
CBPP1 850 41.167 16.045 4.200 61.100 
      
Source: authors’ computations. 
 
Table A2. Data Description and Sources 
Variable Description Source 
Bond_Spread 10 year bond yield spread against German bond ECB; Own calculations 
VIX Chicago Board of Exchange Volatility Index Bloomberg 
BAS 10 year bond yield bid-ask Spread Bloomberg; ECB 
REER Real Effective Exchange Rate, CPI based IFS 
IP_PCH_DEU Annual growth rate differentials of IP(seas adjusted) vs Germany IMF 
DF Deposit Facility, percent per annum  ECB 
MLF Marginal Lending Facility, percent per annum ECB 
MRO_F Main Refinancing Operations-fixed rate tenders, percent per annum ECB 
MRO_V Main Refinancing Operations-variable rate tenders, percent per annum ECB 
LTRO Longer-term Refinancing Operation (includes TLTRO_l and TLTRO_ll), Holdings ECB 
Net_LTRO Longer-term Refinancing Operation, Holdings ECB and own calculations 
TLTRO_l First Targeted Longer-term Refinancing Operation, Holdings ECB and own calculations 
TLTRO_ll Second Targeted Longer-term Refinancing Operation, Holdings ECB 
SMP Securities Market Programme, Holdings ECB 
CBPP1 Covered bond purchase programme 1, Holdings ECB 
F1_debt General Government Gross Debt – one year ahead forecasts EC 
F1_OB General Government Balance – one year ahead forecasts EC 
F1_CAB Current Account Balance – one year ahead forecasts EC 
F2_debt General Government Gross Debt – two years ahead forecasts EC 
F2_OB General Government Balance – two years ahead forecasts EC 
F2_CAB Current Account Balance – two years ahead forecasts EC 
 
Notes: Expected budget balances and government debt are the differences vis-à-vis Germany of the European Commission vintage 







Table A3 – Type 1 Fiscal events (Excessive Deficit Procedures (EDP)) 
country date event country date event 
Austria 02.12.2009 +1 Ireland 27.04.2009 +1 
 20.06.2014 -1  02.12.2009 +1 
Belgium 02.12.2009 +1  07.12.2010 +1 
 21.06.2013 +1  17.06.2016 -1 
 20.06.2014 -1 Italy 05.07.2004 -1 
Finland 13.07.2010 +1  28.07.2005 +1 
 12.07.2011 -1  03.06.2008 -1 
France 21.01.2003 +1  02.12.2009 +1 
 03.06.2003 +1  21.06.2013 -1 
 30.01.2007 -1 The Netherlands 02.06.2004 +1 
 27.04.2009 +1  07.06.2005 -1 
 02.12.2009 +1  02.12.2009 +1 
 21.06.2013 +1  21.06.2013 +1 
 27.02.2015 +1  20.06.2014 -1 
 10.03.2015 +1 Portugal 12.02.2002 -1 
Greece 05.07.2004 +1  20.09.2005 +1 
 18.01.2005 +1  03.06.2008 -1 
 17.02.2005 +1  02.12.2009 +1 
 05.06.2007 -1  09.10.2010 +1 
 27.04.2009 +1  21.06.2013 +1 
 02.12.2009 +1  12.07.2016 +1 
 16.02.2010 +1 Spain 27.04.2009 +1 
 10.05.2010 +1  02.12.2009 +1 
 07.09.2010 +1  10.07.2012 +1 
 07.03.2011 +1  21.06.2013 +1 
 12.07.2011 +1  12.07.2016 +1 
 08.11.2011 +1    
 13.03.2012 +1    
 04.12.2012 +1    
 20.08.2015 +1    
 
Note: Events that have negative impact are flagged by +1 (increasing the spreads) and events that have positive are flagged by -1 
(decreasing the spreads). For instance, on 02.12.2009 EC reports the council decision on the existence of an excessive deficit for 
Austria, which is considered as a negative effect, that increases the yield, spreads so it is flagged by +1. On 20.06.2014 EC reports 
council decision abrogating the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit for Austria where it is flagged by -1 as it has a 








Table A4 – Type 1 Monetary events (Key ECB interest rates) 
Date DF MRO (fixed and 
variable rates) 
MLF 
1999 01 January 2.00 3.00 4.50 
 04 January 2.75 3.00 3.25 
 22 January 2.00 3.00 4.50 
 09 April 1.50 2.50 3.50 
 05 November 2.00 3.00 4.00 
2000 04 February 2.25 3.25 4.25 
 17 March 2.50 3.50 4.50 
 28 April 2.75 3.75 4.75 
 28 June 3.25 4.25 5.25 
 01 September 3.50 4.50 5.50 
 06 October 3.75 4.75 5.75 
2001 11 May 3.50 4.50 5.50 
 31 August 3.25 4.25 5.25 
 18 September 2.75 3.75 4.75 
 09 November 2.25 3.25 4.25 
2002 06 December 1.75 2.75 3.75 
2003 07 March 1.50 2.50 3.50 
 06 June 1.00 2.00 3.00 
2005 06 December 1.25 2.25 3.25 
2006 08 March 1.50 2.50 3.50 
 15 June 1.75 2.75 3.75 
 09 September 2.00 3.00 4.00 
 11 October 2.25 3.25 4.25 
 13 December 2.50 3.50 4.50 
2007 14 March 2.75 3.75 4.75 
 13 July 3.00 4.00 5.00 
2008 09 July 3.25 4.25 5.25 
 08 October 2.75 - 4.75 
 09 October 3.25 - 4.25 
 15 October 3.25 3.75 4.25 
 12 November 2.75 3.25 3.75 
 10 December 2.00 2.50 3.00 
2009 21 January 1.00 2.00 3.00 
 11 March 0.50 1.50 2.50 
 08 April 0.25 1.25 2.25 
 13 May 0.25 1.00 1.75 
2011 13 April 0.50 1.25 2.00 
 13 July 0.75 1.50 2.25 
 09 November 0.50 1.25 2.00 
 14 December 0.25 1.00 1.75 
2012 11 July 0.00 0.75 1.50 
2013 08 May 0.00 0.50 1.00 
 13 November 0.00 0.25 0.75 
2014 11 June -0.10 0.15 0.40 
 10 September -0.20 0.05 0.30 
2015 09 December -0.30 0.05 0.30 
2016 16 March -0.40 0.00 0.25 
 
Notes: DF - The interest rate on the deposit facility; MLF – The interest rate on the marginal lending facility; MRO – The interest 
rate on the marginal refinancing operations. We merged the fixed and variable rate tenders to a single column. On 08.06.2000 the 
ECB announced that, starting from the operations to be settled on 28.06.2006 the MROs of the Eurosystem would be conducted as 
variable rate tenders. On 08.10.2008 the ECB announced that starting from the operations to be settled on 15.10.2008, the weekly 
MROs would be carried out through a fixed rate tender procedure. As we used monthly data in our study, we only considered the 








Table A5 – Type 2 Monetary events 
(Conventional and Unconventional monetary policy) 
 











refinancing operations I 
(TLTRO I) 
No 5 June 2014 
June 2014 – May 2016 
Targeted longer-term 
refinancing operations II 
(TLTRO II) 
No 10 March 2016 




Covered bond purchase 
programme (CBPP1) 
No 7 May 2009 
July 2009 – June 2010 
Securities Markets Programme 
(SMP) 
No 10 May 2010   
May 2010 - September 
2012 
 
